The X Prize Foundation has just announced its latest competition- the Oil Cleanup X Challenge.
Basically, the competition will reward teams from around the world that come up with the most innovative solutions to removing spilled oil from the surface of the ocean, at the spill site. Offshore E&P and tankers are among the spill sources for which cleanup solutions are sought.
Proposals will be evaluated by a team of experts. The top teams will then demonstrate their solutions at the OHMSETT oil spill testing facility in New Jersey, USA. The winning team gets $1 Million, the runner up $300,000, and the third place finisher $100,000. Teams are invited to pre-register now, with the final rules for the competition being posted in September of this year. The competition will be open until April, 2011.
As for the X Prize Foundation, readers may recall that several years ago they launched a $10 million competition ( the Ansari X Prize ) to build a small spacecraft capable of transporting three people 100 kms above the earth's surface. The current competition is called the Wendy Schmidt Oil Cleanup X Challenge, after the competition's benefactor, who is the President of the Schmidt Family Foundation, which supports the development of clean energy and the wise use of natural resources.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Friday, July 30, 2010
X Prize Foundation Launches Oil Spill Competition
The X Prize Foundation in the United States is offering a $USD 1.4 million prize for the best solution to cleaning up oil spills at sea. Click here for details on the year-long competition, including how to enter your team.
Monday, June 21, 2010
Why Isn't the MV Arca in the Gulf?
The MV Arca, a dedicated Dutch oil skimming vessel which I had the good fortune to tour in Brest, France in 2002, is the most advanced oil spill response vessel in the world. The vessel, which was built in 1998, operates using two sweeping arms, one on each side of the vessel, which allow oil on the water's surface to be corralled and skimmed on board, where the water in the oil/water mixture will be separated out before being discharged back into the ocean.
The MV Arca has a storage capacity of 1080 m3; that translates into 6792 barrels of oil. When storage capacity is reached, the oil can easily and quickly be transferred to another vessel for eventual disposal and/or recycling onshore. The sweeping arms can recover 240 m3/hr, or 1509 barrels/hr, and can be operated when the waves are six feet high or more. In order to operate effectively, the MV Arca requires aerial guidance to direct it into areas where the oil is of a certain thickness- the MV Arca works best when the oil is thicker. Thus, effective operation of the MV Arca requires oil of a certain thickness, plus good logistical coordination between spotter planes, the MV Arca and other 'receiving' vessels.
The ability of the vessel to separate the water from the oil is a key feature of the MV Arca, since typically the oil/water mixture that is recovered at sea after an incident consists mainly of water. In other words, if you can separate the oil from the water at sea, and just store the oil on board, then you can significantly increase the amount of oil recovered in any given day, and save a lot of time, effort and money in the process. Otherwise, the voluminous oil/water mixture has to be transferred to a shore-based facility where separation can occur. But for the system to really work effectively, the quality of the 'effluent' has to be good enough such that it can be discharged back into the sea. Even Kevin Costner's now famous centrifugal oil spill separation system has only been able to get the oil content in the treated oil/water mixture down to 80 ppm, which is well below the international Marpol standard of 15 ppm. Until such time as the lower figure is achieved, Costner's oil and water will both have to be stored on board, which kind of defeats the purpose of separating the water out of it at sea.
But if the MV Arca is so efficient and effective, then why isn't she in the Gulf? Well, it's absence cannot, apparently, be explained by the infamous US Jones Act, which bars foreign commercial vessels from transporting merchandise between American ports. There is, in fact, an exemption from this requirement for foreign oil spill response vessels, and fifteen other foreign oil spill vessels are said to be operating in the Gulf as we speak as a result of this waiver. So, if it's not the Jones Act holding the MV Arca back, what is? Two possible explanations have been advanced. First, I am told by Sjon Huisman, a Dutch oil spill response expert with the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, that the current practice of mixing the escaping Deepwater Horizon oil with dispersants at a depth of five miles makes mechanical recovery of oil on the surface very difficult, because the oil that eventually does surface from the seabed forms a very thin layer. Second, as with Kevin Costner's centrifugal system, a British colleague of mine claims that the oily water that the MV Arca discharges back into the sea apparently fails to meet the international Marpol standard of 15 ppm of oil as well.
It should be pointed out that while the MV Arca has not been deployed to the Gulf, the US has accepted a Dutch offer of six pairs of the same type of sweeping arms that are employed on the MV Arca. These are being used close to shore, mounted on hopper dredgers, tankers or any other vessels with large storage capacity, according to another Dutch colleague intimately familiar with the MV Arca.
But are the two reasons given above for the MV Arca's absence from the Gulf really plausible? For one thing, if it were deployed to the region, perhaps those vast quantities of controversial subsea dispersants would no longer be used on the spill. And as for the claim that the quality of the oily water discharged by the MV Arca fails to meet international Marpol standards, this appears to be somewhat of a red herring. For, as Mr. Huisman explains, the 'decanted' water is pumped overboard well in front of the sweep, so that if there is oil in it, it can be recovered in a second sweep. Moreover, if the quality of water the MV Arca water discharges is good enough for Europe, the home base of the vessel, then why isn't it good enough for the Gulf?
It's all rather hard to take, really. Just imagine how much oil this super-modern vessel could have recovered from the Gulf if it had been working there for the past fifty days or so in the immediate vicinity of the Deepwater Horizon incident site. Put another way, just think how much oil could have been prevented from spreading and emulsifying, some of it eventually ending up on shore, if the American authorities had done a Net Environmental Benefit Analysis, and concluded that overall the effect of the MV Arca's operations on the marine environment would be overwhelmingly positive, as most certainly seems to be the case.
It's a shame, really, and it puts paid to the claim that both BP and the US authorities are pulling out all the stops to contain the spill and mitigate the damage from it. If that were true, wouldn't they have commissioned the MV Arca long ago? In short, this looks like just another instance of ineptitude on the part of Deepwater Horizon Unified Command, which includes the US Coast Guard, BP, NOAA and the EPA.
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Is 'Unified Command' Partly to Blame for the Confused Federal Deepwater Horizon Response Effort
One of the issues the recently-established Presidential Commission into the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster should look into is the US command structure for major oil spill response. Major deficiencies in the way this system is designed could go some way to explaining the somewhat confused federal response to this catastrophic incident.
The US employs the Unified Command system for coordinating federal response to incidents such as this. This organisational structure was started in California for use in fighting forest fires. It has since been adapted for use around the world in the case of all types of emergencies, from earthquakes to hurricanes, e.g. Katrina. The way the system works is that a phalanx of fourteen government departments sit around a table, each with veto power over decisionmaking. There is an Incident Commander, appointed from the Coast Guard, but on paper at least this official has little sway over the various other departments involved, such as NOAA, EPA, OSHA, Fish and Wildlife, National Parks, MMS, not to mention the various Gulf states with interests in the spill. In effect, each of these agencies operates as the final authority within their area of jurisdiction and responsibility. In other words, while there is a certain degree of coordination between them, each agency operates within its own little 'silo'. No one tells anyone what to do, and everyone just informs everyone else of what they intend to do. The potentially disastrous consequences of such a control structure were no more evident than in the case of the 2005 Katrina hurricane disaster which struck the Gulf, where chaos was the order of the day. The current Gulf spill response effort is nowhere near as bad as Katrina, but obvious deficiencies at the core of the system linger five years later.
The American incident response regime contrasts sharply with the Canadian model, which is simply called Incident Command. The Canadian response model is a much more muscular Command and Control structure, with Coast Guard playing the role of Lead Agency, supported by numerous other federal departments, and with virtually no role for the provinces, such as British Columbia. Other departments and levels of government may not like the Canadian model- in fact, some downright detest it, but on balance it does tend to cut through the red tape and allow for quick, decisive action and leadership.
It is of course too early to tell whether the US Unified Command response model is to blame for confusion and tardiness with respect to numerous contentious issues such as subsea dispersant use, estimating the spill size, the existence of underwater plumes, to name but a few. Nevertheless, the Presidential commission does provide an opportunity to evaluate the system to see whether it helped or hampered the response effort in this particular case.
The US employs the Unified Command system for coordinating federal response to incidents such as this. This organisational structure was started in California for use in fighting forest fires. It has since been adapted for use around the world in the case of all types of emergencies, from earthquakes to hurricanes, e.g. Katrina. The way the system works is that a phalanx of fourteen government departments sit around a table, each with veto power over decisionmaking. There is an Incident Commander, appointed from the Coast Guard, but on paper at least this official has little sway over the various other departments involved, such as NOAA, EPA, OSHA, Fish and Wildlife, National Parks, MMS, not to mention the various Gulf states with interests in the spill. In effect, each of these agencies operates as the final authority within their area of jurisdiction and responsibility. In other words, while there is a certain degree of coordination between them, each agency operates within its own little 'silo'. No one tells anyone what to do, and everyone just informs everyone else of what they intend to do. The potentially disastrous consequences of such a control structure were no more evident than in the case of the 2005 Katrina hurricane disaster which struck the Gulf, where chaos was the order of the day. The current Gulf spill response effort is nowhere near as bad as Katrina, but obvious deficiencies at the core of the system linger five years later.
The American incident response regime contrasts sharply with the Canadian model, which is simply called Incident Command. The Canadian response model is a much more muscular Command and Control structure, with Coast Guard playing the role of Lead Agency, supported by numerous other federal departments, and with virtually no role for the provinces, such as British Columbia. Other departments and levels of government may not like the Canadian model- in fact, some downright detest it, but on balance it does tend to cut through the red tape and allow for quick, decisive action and leadership.
It is of course too early to tell whether the US Unified Command response model is to blame for confusion and tardiness with respect to numerous contentious issues such as subsea dispersant use, estimating the spill size, the existence of underwater plumes, to name but a few. Nevertheless, the Presidential commission does provide an opportunity to evaluate the system to see whether it helped or hampered the response effort in this particular case.
US Now "Owns the Podium" with Respect to Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Now that the US Dept. of Justice has launched a criminal investigation into BP's conduct with respect to the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig fire, explosion and ensuing oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, the tone of the US's government's attitude to BP has changed noticeably. For one thing, USCG Vice-Admiral Mary Landry has been stood down from her duties with respect to the spill response operation- from now on she'll be dealing with preparations for the oncoming hurricane season in the Gulf. Also, we are told there will be no more joint US Govt-BP press conferences. Instead, USCG Admiral Thad Allen will be the prime spokesperson for anything to do with the spill. Apparently, then, the US government is seeking to 'own the podium', some forty-five days into the spill response operation.
In other words, the rather cozy relationship that we've seen thus far between the Repsonsible Party, aka "The Polluter" and the Incident Commmander, in the form of the Coast Guard head, has ended. There's no way the Coast Guard and BP could be seen standing shoulder to shoulder when BP itself is under criminal investigation for its conduct before, during and after the incident which occurred on April 20, 2010, when the rig caught fire and exploded as a result of a blowout, with the loss of ten lives. How this seachange will affect the spill response operation on the ground is anyone's guess, since the government is still dependent upon the oilpatch for much of the subsea expertise and equipment, but it does reflect increasing exasperation on the part of the White House with respect to BP's handling of the spill. Chances are the public and private sectors will continue to cooperate, since they have little choice but to do so, really, but on the public level the optics will be substantially different. And with the Coast Guard's Thad Allen now become the public face of the BP spill, there is now the risk that if yet another attempt to stem the leak fails, the public will increasingly blame the government for the entire fiasco rather than the actual polluter.
In other words, the rather cozy relationship that we've seen thus far between the Repsonsible Party, aka "The Polluter" and the Incident Commmander, in the form of the Coast Guard head, has ended. There's no way the Coast Guard and BP could be seen standing shoulder to shoulder when BP itself is under criminal investigation for its conduct before, during and after the incident which occurred on April 20, 2010, when the rig caught fire and exploded as a result of a blowout, with the loss of ten lives. How this seachange will affect the spill response operation on the ground is anyone's guess, since the government is still dependent upon the oilpatch for much of the subsea expertise and equipment, but it does reflect increasing exasperation on the part of the White House with respect to BP's handling of the spill. Chances are the public and private sectors will continue to cooperate, since they have little choice but to do so, really, but on the public level the optics will be substantially different. And with the Coast Guard's Thad Allen now become the public face of the BP spill, there is now the risk that if yet another attempt to stem the leak fails, the public will increasingly blame the government for the entire fiasco rather than the actual polluter.
The Tyee Chooses "Marine Oil Spills" Blog as Its Blog of the Week
The Tyee, British Columbia, Canada's number one online newspaper, has chosen this blog, with its recent extensive coverage of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, as its Blog of the Week. Thanks to Crawford Kilian for noticing us. This blog has also been selected as one of the Tyee's Top Ten Gulf Oil Spill Sites
Sunday, May 23, 2010
US Government May Take Over Deepwater Horizon Spill Response
US Interior Secretary Ken Salazar warned BP on Sunday that unless it pulls up its socks, the US government may puch it aside on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response operation, and do the job itself. Some commentators have said such a move wouldn't work, because BP is the only entity with the expertise to operate at a depth of 5000 feet beneath the sea. That can't be true, since BP doesn't have that kind of in-house expertise itself; instead, it relies on outside contractors to do virtually all of the response work, from supply vessels to robots. On the other hand, BP, as one of the Seven Sisters of oil majors, does have access to oilpatch expertise from around the world on this spill. If the US govvernment were to take over the operation from BP, BP's frenemies might not be so willing to help out finding solutions, with the government left holding the bag.
Saturday, May 22, 2010
BP's Survival Could Be at Stake as a Result of Potential Fines for Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in Gulf of Mexico
There's a good reason for BP to underestimate the flow of oil from the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico. Apparently, if US law is strictly enforced, and if criminal negligence is involved, as it very well could be, BP could be fined up to $4300 per day PER BARREL of oil spilled.
What could the fine end up costing BP? An article in the Guardian cites a US environmental lawyer as predicting the total fines to BP could reach up to $60 billion US if the spill continues unchecked for another two months. The estimate is based on an assumed daily flow rate of 115,000 barrels of oil. which is 21 times the official estimate of 5,000 barrels per day. Two months is the estimated time required to drill a relief well.
So, as you can readily appreciate, this makes the recently-announced U.S. federal inquiry into how much is being spilled all the more important, in more ways than one. Because at the end of the day, the company's survival may be at stake.
What could the fine end up costing BP? An article in the Guardian cites a US environmental lawyer as predicting the total fines to BP could reach up to $60 billion US if the spill continues unchecked for another two months. The estimate is based on an assumed daily flow rate of 115,000 barrels of oil. which is 21 times the official estimate of 5,000 barrels per day. Two months is the estimated time required to drill a relief well.
So, as you can readily appreciate, this makes the recently-announced U.S. federal inquiry into how much is being spilled all the more important, in more ways than one. Because at the end of the day, the company's survival may be at stake.
Should the US Coast Guard Take Over the Deepwater Horizon Response Operation from BP? Canadian vs. U.S. Law
In numerous press reports of late, it has been suggested that the United States Coast Guard take over the Deepwater Horizon response operation in the Gulf of Mexico because of a widespread perception that BP's performance has not been up to scratch. However, the general view appears to be that U.S. law, which makes the polluter the party responsible for cleanup, does not permit this kind of takeover.
Here in Canada, the legal situation is somewhat different. The relevant Canadian oil spill law stipulates that in the case of a marine oil spill incident, although the polluter is in principle responsible for spill cleanup, the Canadian Coast Guard ( CCG ) takes on the role of Federal Monitoring Officer ( FMO ). If the FMO determines at any time that the polluter ( aka the Responsible Party ) is either unwilling or unable to respond to the incident, then the CCG can take over the entire operation. This law was introduced after the Exxon Valdez spill, on the recommendation of a panel I worked for full-time for nine months- the so-called Tanker Safety Panel. It is generally assumed that if an incident similar to the Deepwater Horizon one in nature and scale were to occur anywhere in Canadian waters, Coast Guard would take over the responsibility right away, assuming command, commandeering whatever resources were necessary to combat the spill, and sending the bill to the polluter.
Which spill response regime do you think is better, the Canadian or the American one? Is this something you think the Presidential panel POTUS announced this morning should look into, perhaps? I'd like to know. Feel free to comment below in the space below.
Here in Canada, the legal situation is somewhat different. The relevant Canadian oil spill law stipulates that in the case of a marine oil spill incident, although the polluter is in principle responsible for spill cleanup, the Canadian Coast Guard ( CCG ) takes on the role of Federal Monitoring Officer ( FMO ). If the FMO determines at any time that the polluter ( aka the Responsible Party ) is either unwilling or unable to respond to the incident, then the CCG can take over the entire operation. This law was introduced after the Exxon Valdez spill, on the recommendation of a panel I worked for full-time for nine months- the so-called Tanker Safety Panel. It is generally assumed that if an incident similar to the Deepwater Horizon one in nature and scale were to occur anywhere in Canadian waters, Coast Guard would take over the responsibility right away, assuming command, commandeering whatever resources were necessary to combat the spill, and sending the bill to the polluter.
Which spill response regime do you think is better, the Canadian or the American one? Is this something you think the Presidential panel POTUS announced this morning should look into, perhaps? I'd like to know. Feel free to comment below in the space below.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
MarketWatch Article on Dr. Gerald Graham's Role in Stopping Deepwater Horizon Riser Leak
MarketWatch May 18, 2010, 1:51 p.m. EDT
BP ignored siphon-pipe suggestion, oil-spill expert says
By Steve Gelsi, MarketWatch
NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- An offshore-oil consultant suggested that BP PLC use a mile-long pipe to minimize damage from its big leak in the Gulf of Mexico weeks before the company reported some success with the technique.
If BP (NYSE:BP) had followed his suggestion sooner, thousands of barrels of oil could have been contained, according to Gerald Graham, an oil-spill specialist with his own firm, Worldocean Consulting Ltd. of Victoria, British Columbia.
In an April 29 email, Graham urged the company to deploy "5,000-foot long hoses ... at the points where the leaks are, with a view to siphoning the oil off to the ocean's surface," he wrote. Graham forwarded a copy of the email MarketWatch late Monday.
Water divining gains popularity in India
Water divining, a traditional method to locate underground water, is gaining popularity in Maharashtra, India amid severe water shortages.
Just a few days ago, BP announced that it came to the same conclusion. The oil major deployed its so-called riser insertion tube over the weekend, and on Tuesday said it's now sucking up about 2,000 barrels a day out of the estimated 5,000 barrel-a-day spill. See full story.
Graham said he did receive a message from the Deepwater Horizon response team to send his email to Nicole Scillo at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and that he forwarded his note but never heard back.
Scillo is listed on NOAA's Web site as an information-technology specialist in the agency's technical-services branch. She did not return a phone call or an email from MarketWatch inquiring about Graham's email.
"I never received an acknowledgment of my suggestions, in spite of [BP's] public statements that ideas were welcome from any and all quarters, that each suggestion would be carefully analyzed and evaluated and that the person making the suggestion would be notified as to the outcome of that evaluation," Graham said in an interview.
BP spokesman Matt Taylor said the company received a "few inquiries" from people wondering asking whether their ideas were taken up. "The reality is that there have been literally thousands of suggestions, with naturally many people offering similar solutions, including using another pipe to insert in to the leaking riser," he acknowledged.
The Deepwater Horizon response center "has done its very best to process suggestions and forward on those that are considered potentially effective to another level of scrutiny," he said.
Taylor added that he did not know why the siphon tube was not tried earlier. "I can assure [Graham] we have had the best engineering minds working on this, and they have been doing what they feel are the best options in the circumstances and in the best sequence."
BP initially focused on building a large containment dome for about 10 days after the spill. The dome failed after it got clogged by ice-like crystals that formed once oil and natural gas from the well came into contact with the low temperatures and high pressures at the bottom of the ocean. The company didn't mention the idea of inserting a tube into the leaking pipe until May 12.
During a briefing on Friday, BP executive Doug Suttles said the insertion tube had been developed during the same time that the company was planning to lower a "top-hat" containment dome to the sea floor.
"I may not have been the first to get the idea of a siphon in, but what were they doing? It just doesn't make sense." Gerald Graham
"[BP] could have been working on inserting the tube while they were building the containment dome," according to Graham. "I may not have been the first to get the idea of a siphon in, but what were they doing? It just doesn't make sense."
Two weeks after submitted his idea, he said he read in media report that BP indeed was planning to insert a tube into the riser.
Prior to his siphon-tube suggestion, Graham wrote BP on April 25 to suggest placing a cap over a leaky portion of the riser, part of the well-piping system damaged in the April 20 fire and April 22 sinking of the Deepwater Horizon rig.
Whether BP saw his suggestion about the cap is not known, but it did cap the riser leak just a few days after the accident.
Graham pointed out that his credentials include training with the Canadian Coast Guard and 30 yeas as an environmental consultant. He added that he's worked for the Canadian government department responsible for offshore oil and gas.
The consultant said he's written to Chief Executive Tony Hayward regarding his suggestions, but hasn't heard back either.
BP ignored siphon-pipe suggestion, oil-spill expert says
By Steve Gelsi, MarketWatch
NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- An offshore-oil consultant suggested that BP PLC use a mile-long pipe to minimize damage from its big leak in the Gulf of Mexico weeks before the company reported some success with the technique.
If BP (NYSE:BP) had followed his suggestion sooner, thousands of barrels of oil could have been contained, according to Gerald Graham, an oil-spill specialist with his own firm, Worldocean Consulting Ltd. of Victoria, British Columbia.
In an April 29 email, Graham urged the company to deploy "5,000-foot long hoses ... at the points where the leaks are, with a view to siphoning the oil off to the ocean's surface," he wrote. Graham forwarded a copy of the email MarketWatch late Monday.
Water divining gains popularity in India
Water divining, a traditional method to locate underground water, is gaining popularity in Maharashtra, India amid severe water shortages.
Just a few days ago, BP announced that it came to the same conclusion. The oil major deployed its so-called riser insertion tube over the weekend, and on Tuesday said it's now sucking up about 2,000 barrels a day out of the estimated 5,000 barrel-a-day spill. See full story.
Graham said he did receive a message from the Deepwater Horizon response team to send his email to Nicole Scillo at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and that he forwarded his note but never heard back.
Scillo is listed on NOAA's Web site as an information-technology specialist in the agency's technical-services branch. She did not return a phone call or an email from MarketWatch inquiring about Graham's email.
"I never received an acknowledgment of my suggestions, in spite of [BP's] public statements that ideas were welcome from any and all quarters, that each suggestion would be carefully analyzed and evaluated and that the person making the suggestion would be notified as to the outcome of that evaluation," Graham said in an interview.
BP spokesman Matt Taylor said the company received a "few inquiries" from people wondering asking whether their ideas were taken up. "The reality is that there have been literally thousands of suggestions, with naturally many people offering similar solutions, including using another pipe to insert in to the leaking riser," he acknowledged.
The Deepwater Horizon response center "has done its very best to process suggestions and forward on those that are considered potentially effective to another level of scrutiny," he said.
Taylor added that he did not know why the siphon tube was not tried earlier. "I can assure [Graham] we have had the best engineering minds working on this, and they have been doing what they feel are the best options in the circumstances and in the best sequence."
BP initially focused on building a large containment dome for about 10 days after the spill. The dome failed after it got clogged by ice-like crystals that formed once oil and natural gas from the well came into contact with the low temperatures and high pressures at the bottom of the ocean. The company didn't mention the idea of inserting a tube into the leaking pipe until May 12.
During a briefing on Friday, BP executive Doug Suttles said the insertion tube had been developed during the same time that the company was planning to lower a "top-hat" containment dome to the sea floor.
"I may not have been the first to get the idea of a siphon in, but what were they doing? It just doesn't make sense." Gerald Graham
"[BP] could have been working on inserting the tube while they were building the containment dome," according to Graham. "I may not have been the first to get the idea of a siphon in, but what were they doing? It just doesn't make sense."
Two weeks after submitted his idea, he said he read in media report that BP indeed was planning to insert a tube into the riser.
Prior to his siphon-tube suggestion, Graham wrote BP on April 25 to suggest placing a cap over a leaky portion of the riser, part of the well-piping system damaged in the April 20 fire and April 22 sinking of the Deepwater Horizon rig.
Whether BP saw his suggestion about the cap is not known, but it did cap the riser leak just a few days after the accident.
Graham pointed out that his credentials include training with the Canadian Coast Guard and 30 yeas as an environmental consultant. He added that he's worked for the Canadian government department responsible for offshore oil and gas.
The consultant said he's written to Chief Executive Tony Hayward regarding his suggestions, but hasn't heard back either.
Early Riser: Laying Claim to the Deepwater Horizon Insertion Tube Idea
In this podcast of a radio interview with Al Gardner and Stacey Simms, broadcast on WBT, Charlotte, NC on Monday, May 17, 2010, for the first time on the public airwaves Dr. Gerald Graham, President of Worldocean Consulting Ltd, stakes his claim to a variation of BP's riser insertion tube idea for staunching the flow of oil from its Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Dr. Graham suggested to BP and others members of Unified Command as early as April 29, 2010 that a 5000 foot hose be attached to the leaky riser, and oil siphoned off to a waiting vessel on the surface. Over two weeks later, they managed to do just that, refining his original idea into a workable technique that before it was withdrawn May 25 after eight days of operation, reportedly prevented 22,000 barrels of oil from entering the marine environment.
Dr. Graham suggested to BP and others members of Unified Command as early as April 29, 2010 that a 5000 foot hose be attached to the leaky riser, and oil siphoned off to a waiting vessel on the surface. Over two weeks later, they managed to do just that, refining his original idea into a workable technique that before it was withdrawn May 25 after eight days of operation, reportedly prevented 22,000 barrels of oil from entering the marine environment.
Monday, May 17, 2010
Origin of Deepwater Horizon Riser Insertion Tube Option, as Well as the Idea of Capping the End of the Leaky Riser
The idea of attaching a hose to the leaky Deepwater Horizon riser and siphoning the oil off to a waiting vessel on the surface did not initially come from inside The Bunker. Instead, it came from me. I suggested this procedure to Unified Command which, as you know, includes BP, as early as April 29. On the same day I forwarded my suggestion to NOAA as well. The riser insert tube option is basically a refinement of my original idea.
I guess the big question is, why did it take so long, i.e. the better part of two weeks, to run with my idea? I suspect the answer lies in the fact BP were wedded to the concept of the dome, which of course failed in the end. Had my proposal been implemented earlier, while the dome was under construction, for instance, think how much oil might have been prevented from entering the marine environment.
This just looks like yet another case of colossal incompetence on the part of the polluter, aka the Responsible Party, with respect to this particular incident response operation. Precious time was lost while the company fooled around with an option in which they themselves publicly showed scant confidence, all the while ignoring a simple, straightforward and rather obvious solution that was staring them in the face. It’s scandalous, really.
I have repeatedly sought acknowledgement of my part in solving this problem from the authorities and BP. So far, the only response I get is from Unified Command, in the form of a form email informing me, in so many words, that my suggestion has been reviewed and rejected because it is impractical. This is an insult to my intelligence, really, as well as a slap in the face.
And for the record, my first suggestion to Unified Command, forwarded to them on April 25, was to cap the end of the leaky riser pipe, something they managed to do over a week later, again without any acknowledgment that the idea basically came from me after I had seen photos of the leaky pipe end on the web.
I guess the big question is, why did it take so long, i.e. the better part of two weeks, to run with my idea? I suspect the answer lies in the fact BP were wedded to the concept of the dome, which of course failed in the end. Had my proposal been implemented earlier, while the dome was under construction, for instance, think how much oil might have been prevented from entering the marine environment.
This just looks like yet another case of colossal incompetence on the part of the polluter, aka the Responsible Party, with respect to this particular incident response operation. Precious time was lost while the company fooled around with an option in which they themselves publicly showed scant confidence, all the while ignoring a simple, straightforward and rather obvious solution that was staring them in the face. It’s scandalous, really.
I have repeatedly sought acknowledgement of my part in solving this problem from the authorities and BP. So far, the only response I get is from Unified Command, in the form of a form email informing me, in so many words, that my suggestion has been reviewed and rejected because it is impractical. This is an insult to my intelligence, really, as well as a slap in the face.
And for the record, my first suggestion to Unified Command, forwarded to them on April 25, was to cap the end of the leaky riser pipe, something they managed to do over a week later, again without any acknowledgment that the idea basically came from me after I had seen photos of the leaky pipe end on the web.
Sunday, May 16, 2010
Gerald Graham Awaits Recognition of His Contribution to Successful Deepwater Horizon Riser Insertion Tube Operation
BP is reporting that the riser inserion tube operation on the Deepwater Horizon site has basically worked. This technique is a variation of an idea I forwarded to them and to BP ( who are part of Unified Command ) on April 29. My original idea was to attach a 5000 foot hose to the leaky riser and siphon the oil to a waiting vessel on the surface. Better late than never, I suppose, but just think how much oil has entered the marine environment while they dithered over this option, instead of trying it out while their ( ultimately unsuccessful ) dome was being built, for instance.
In any case, congratulations to the team of engineers toiling night and day on this option at the BP Crisis Centre in Houston. Acknowledgment of my contribution to finding this solution is eagerly anticipated, from no less than Mr. Tony Hayward, CEO of BP. Kudos from POTUS would also be appropriate, under the circumstances.
In any case, congratulations to the team of engineers toiling night and day on this option at the BP Crisis Centre in Houston. Acknowledgment of my contribution to finding this solution is eagerly anticipated, from no less than Mr. Tony Hayward, CEO of BP. Kudos from POTUS would also be appropriate, under the circumstances.
Friday, May 14, 2010
BP Throws Brick Through 'Window of Opportunity'
Oil spill experts frequently refer to what they call the 'window of opportunity' with respect to response operations. By this we mean that at any given time, if you're lucky, one or two, perhaps three response options will work. You must take advantage of these windows of opportunity while they last, i.e. before the window closes, and before catastrophic damage occurs. Well, three weeks into the Deepwater Horizon incident, BP has essentially thrown a brick through this incredibly long, by oil spill standards at least, window of opportunity. A three week period in which Mother Nature cooperated by somehow keeping the bulk of the spilled oil offshore. In that time, the polluter, aka the Responsible Party, has failed to stop the flow of oil from the seabed. They've had more than ample time, but they seemingly frittered away this natural advantage they were granted. And even if they find a stopgap solution this very minute, there'll be significant quantities of oil out there on the water for days, if not weeks or even months to come. Unfortunately, the window of opportunity, principally the fair weather and favourable winds, will not last forever. And so that precious gift of a 'picture window', as one might call it, could soon pass. And that's when the real blame game and finger pointing will start- when the oil starts washing ashore, fouling the beaches, killing the birds and the turtles and the dolphins and the fish. But let's continue to hope and pray that never happens, and that Lady Luck continues to cast her welcome, if somewhat fickle gaze on the Gulf.
Thursday, May 13, 2010
Open Letter to Mr. Tony Hayward, CEO, BP, re Stemming the Flow of Oil from the Deepwater Horizon Riser
Dear Mr. Hayward,
I am delighted to read that BP are finally getting around to implementing a variation of my idea to attach a 5000 foot hose to the leaky riser. As the record shows, I made this suggestion two weeks ago today for the first time, to Unified Command ( which includes BP ). I fail to see why it has taken BP so long to get around to trying this procedure.
You asked for suggestions from any and all quarters, I gave mine, and you implemented two of them, the first being the idea of capping the leaky riser, which you did successfully, over a week after I suggested it. Thus, I fully expect that my contribution to solving this enormous environmental challenge will be acknowledged in due course.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Gerald Graham, Ph. D.
On Scene Commander for Marine Oil Spill Response
Worldocean Consulting Ltd
I am delighted to read that BP are finally getting around to implementing a variation of my idea to attach a 5000 foot hose to the leaky riser. As the record shows, I made this suggestion two weeks ago today for the first time, to Unified Command ( which includes BP ). I fail to see why it has taken BP so long to get around to trying this procedure.
You asked for suggestions from any and all quarters, I gave mine, and you implemented two of them, the first being the idea of capping the leaky riser, which you did successfully, over a week after I suggested it. Thus, I fully expect that my contribution to solving this enormous environmental challenge will be acknowledged in due course.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Gerald Graham, Ph. D.
On Scene Commander for Marine Oil Spill Response
Worldocean Consulting Ltd
BP Opting for Riser Insertion Tube Option First
CNN and the New York Times are both reporting that BP is going to try to insert a pipe into the riser tonight, in an attempt to stop the Deepwater Horizon leak, and if that doesn't work, they'll try the top hat option, i.e. the small dome placed over the riser. Apparently they've opted for this course of action out of concern that there could still be a buildup of hydrates in the dome, just as there was with the larger dome earlier in the week.
For the record, two weeks ago today I proposed to the authorities, including BP, that a 5000 foot hose be attached to the leaky riser, and oil siphoned off to a waiting vessel on the surface. It's nice to see they are going with a variation of this plan. Let's hope it works, and if it doesn't, that the dome option does. But why didn't they act on my suggestion earlier, while the big dome was being built, for instance? What did they have to lose? Think how much oil might have been prevented from entering the marine environment.
For the record, two weeks ago today I proposed to the authorities, including BP, that a 5000 foot hose be attached to the leaky riser, and oil siphoned off to a waiting vessel on the surface. It's nice to see they are going with a variation of this plan. Let's hope it works, and if it doesn't, that the dome option does. But why didn't they act on my suggestion earlier, while the big dome was being built, for instance? What did they have to lose? Think how much oil might have been prevented from entering the marine environment.
Clarification re Riser Insertion Tube Option
In a recent Houston Chronicle article by Monica Hatcher about BP's latest method for stopping the leak from the Deepwater Horizon riser, it is claimed that BP has unveiled a new option for stopping the leak, the so-called “riser insertion tube option”. It is also stated that BP has a team of hundreds of experts advising it locally. Finally, the assertion is made that this “new” option is “fresh off the drawing board”. For the record, I advanced a similar option to Unified Command ( which includes BP ) and NOAA as early as April 29, and to the BP Crisis Centre May 1. My idea was to “attach a 5000 foot hose” to the leaky risers, and siphon the oil up to waiting vessels on the surface, but for all intents and purposes the two proposals are the same.
Thus, the question arises as to why it would take BP the better part of two weeks to implement such a seemingly simple suggestion. BP appears to have gone to great lengths to explore and test complicated, expensive and time-consuming options, ignoring the principle of Occam's Razor, which basically states that when there are several possible solutions to a problem, the best among them is likely to be the one that is the simplest.
Also, how can it be stated that the riser insertion tube is fresh off the drawing board, when they’ve had two weeks to examine the idea and fine tune it. I mean, does it really take two weeks to design this system? Somehow I doubt it. And lastly, the original idea for this technique did not come from inside BP’s Houston brain trust but from outside- from yours truly.
Thus, the question arises as to why it would take BP the better part of two weeks to implement such a seemingly simple suggestion. BP appears to have gone to great lengths to explore and test complicated, expensive and time-consuming options, ignoring the principle of Occam's Razor, which basically states that when there are several possible solutions to a problem, the best among them is likely to be the one that is the simplest.
Also, how can it be stated that the riser insertion tube is fresh off the drawing board, when they’ve had two weeks to examine the idea and fine tune it. I mean, does it really take two weeks to design this system? Somehow I doubt it. And lastly, the original idea for this technique did not come from inside BP’s Houston brain trust but from outside- from yours truly.
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
BP's Riser Insertion Tube Option Sounds Familiar!
BP announced Wednesday, May 12 that it is seriously considering inserting a tube into the leaky Deepwater Horizon riser on the seabed, as a means of siphoning the oil coming out of that riser up to a vessel on the surface. Click here for a graphic of the proposed operation. This procedure could, we are told, occur as early as late Thursday.
For the record, I suggested a similar procedure to Unified Command ( which includes BP ) and NOAA on April 29, and to the BP Crisis Centre in Houston on May 1. My proposal was described as attaching a hose to the riser, whereas BP describes theirs as inserting a tube into the riser, but for all intents and purposes the two methods are the same. Prior to that, on April 25, I suggested to Unified Command that one of the leaks in the riser be capped, something that was indeed accomplished over a week later. The big question in both cases is: why did it take them so long? What the heck were they waiting for?
Let's hope this new plan works!
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response Operation: A Prognosis for the Next Few Days
If USCG's figures from last week still apply, then only 10% of the oil/water mix recovered so far is oil. However, the model I run predicts that more than 50% of the spilled oil will naturally disperse and/or evaporate within five days. Factor in all the dispersant that's being used both on the sea surface and on the seabed, favourable winds ( for the most part ), plus the reported 13,000 barrels of oil that have been burned at sea, and one can readily see that even though this is a continuous spill, a high percentage of the spilled oil has not made it to shore.
Unfortunately, changing weather patterns over the course of the next few days will make mechanical recovery at sea difficult, if not impossible; controlled burning will probably also not be feasible. And while the stiff winds and waves that are forecast tend to enhance the natural dispersion and breakup of the oil, the winds are headed in the wrong direction, unfortunately, making eventual landfall of much of the oil a strong possibility. But because shoreline protection booms may not hold in this kind of weather, beach cleanup may be the most viable response option for the next few days, especially if tarballs wash ashore. Getting oil out of marshes, though, where the bulk of the slick appears headed, is a major challenge at any time.
Unfortunately, changing weather patterns over the course of the next few days will make mechanical recovery at sea difficult, if not impossible; controlled burning will probably also not be feasible. And while the stiff winds and waves that are forecast tend to enhance the natural dispersion and breakup of the oil, the winds are headed in the wrong direction, unfortunately, making eventual landfall of much of the oil a strong possibility. But because shoreline protection booms may not hold in this kind of weather, beach cleanup may be the most viable response option for the next few days, especially if tarballs wash ashore. Getting oil out of marshes, though, where the bulk of the slick appears headed, is a major challenge at any time.
Monday, May 10, 2010
Correspondence with BP Horizon Support Centre
I received this email today from the BP crisis centre in Houston:
"Dear Gerald Graham,
Thank you so much for taking the time to think about and submit your proposed solution regarding the Horizon incident. Your submission has been reviewed for its technical merits. Unfortunately, the team has determined that your idea cannot be applied under the very challenging and specific operating conditions we face. All of us on the Horizon Support Team appreciate your thoughts and efforts.
Sincerely yours,
Horizon Support Team"
This was my reponse to them:
"Which submission are you referring to, I wonder? I've made several suggestions over the course of the past fifteen days, to Unified Command (UC), NOAA and yourselves.
One of my suggestions was to cap the end of the leaky riser. I put forward that idea to UC April 25 ( and to you May 1 ), and you managed to do just that on May 5, apparently.
Then there was my April 29 suggestion to both UC and NOAA, and to you May 1, that a 5000 foot hose be attached to the leaky riser and siphon the oil directly to the surface. In the past 24 hours I've seen numerous reports, including quotes from BP's COO, to the effect that this option, or a variation of it, is being seriously considered, and could in fact be tried as early as Friday.
In short, I am puzzled by your reply- not only is it confusing, but it also appears to be inaccurate. Perhaps you could be somewhat more specific.
Sincerely,
Gerald Graham"
"Dear Gerald Graham,
Thank you so much for taking the time to think about and submit your proposed solution regarding the Horizon incident. Your submission has been reviewed for its technical merits. Unfortunately, the team has determined that your idea cannot be applied under the very challenging and specific operating conditions we face. All of us on the Horizon Support Team appreciate your thoughts and efforts.
Sincerely yours,
Horizon Support Team"
This was my reponse to them:
"Which submission are you referring to, I wonder? I've made several suggestions over the course of the past fifteen days, to Unified Command (UC), NOAA and yourselves.
One of my suggestions was to cap the end of the leaky riser. I put forward that idea to UC April 25 ( and to you May 1 ), and you managed to do just that on May 5, apparently.
Then there was my April 29 suggestion to both UC and NOAA, and to you May 1, that a 5000 foot hose be attached to the leaky riser and siphon the oil directly to the surface. In the past 24 hours I've seen numerous reports, including quotes from BP's COO, to the effect that this option, or a variation of it, is being seriously considered, and could in fact be tried as early as Friday.
In short, I am puzzled by your reply- not only is it confusing, but it also appears to be inaccurate. Perhaps you could be somewhat more specific.
Sincerely,
Gerald Graham"
Sunday, May 9, 2010
BP Considers Option I Suggested to Authorities Ten Days Ago
It is indeed gratifying to read that apparently one of the options I suggested for dealing with the leaky risers is under serious consideration, namely grafting a new pipe on to the leaky riser and directly bringing the oil to the surface, where the pipe or hose transporting it would be connected to a containment vessel. For the record, here’s a similar suggestion I made to both Unified Command and NOAA on April 29:
“…attach 5000 foot long hoses to the riser at the points where the leaks are, with a view to siphoning the oil off to the ocean's surface, for temporary storage and recovery on barges and in tanks, and eventual recycling ashore. I haven't seen any mention of this option either. It's an interim measure, obviously, that would be employed until the source of the leak can be stopped, but if it is feasible it could conceivably avoid a considerable amount of environmental damage and expense by preventing the oil from spreading on the ocean's surface.”
My question for the authorities is: "What took you so long?!”
Then there’s the matter of the dome which has been reportedly set aside on the seabed because it wasn’t working. Why doesn't BP just get some robotic arms on the ROVs to attach cables to the dome at the base, and then try to tip the dome on its side so that it covers the leak and ‘smothers’ the leaking oil, effectively cutting off its escape route into the marine environment? Have they considered this option? If not, why not? I mean, the dome weighs 80 tons. So, surely it’s not going to get knocked out of position if it is flipped on its side.
“…attach 5000 foot long hoses to the riser at the points where the leaks are, with a view to siphoning the oil off to the ocean's surface, for temporary storage and recovery on barges and in tanks, and eventual recycling ashore. I haven't seen any mention of this option either. It's an interim measure, obviously, that would be employed until the source of the leak can be stopped, but if it is feasible it could conceivably avoid a considerable amount of environmental damage and expense by preventing the oil from spreading on the ocean's surface.”
My question for the authorities is: "What took you so long?!”
Then there’s the matter of the dome which has been reportedly set aside on the seabed because it wasn’t working. Why doesn't BP just get some robotic arms on the ROVs to attach cables to the dome at the base, and then try to tip the dome on its side so that it covers the leak and ‘smothers’ the leaking oil, effectively cutting off its escape route into the marine environment? Have they considered this option? If not, why not? I mean, the dome weighs 80 tons. So, surely it’s not going to get knocked out of position if it is flipped on its side.
Why Can't Experts Figure Out a Way to Stop the Deepwater Horizon Oil Leaks?
This video illustrates a psychological phenomenon that may go a long way to explaining the dismal failure so far of hundreds of experts to find a way of stopping the leaks of crude oil from the Deepwater Horizon riser pipe 5000 feet below the surface in the Gulf of Mexico. Have a look and draw your own conclusions.
Saturday, May 8, 2010
Employing Some Lateral Thinking to Plug the Leak, Using the Dome, But in a Diiferent Way
I forwarded the following suggestion to BP as a way of stemming the flow of oil from the Deepwater Horizon laekage 5000 feet below the surface in the Gulf of Mexico:
"I understand that the dome is not working, because of hydrate formation. I don't understand why you have to pipe the leaking oil to the surface in the first place. Why couldn't you just place a heavy object over the leaky pipe? And since you have the dome down there already, and your plan is not working, why don't you just leave the dome there, on top of the leaky pipe, and shut off the valve at the top of the dome where the oil would normally flow through a pipe to the surface? In other words, couldn't the dome just play the role of placing a cap on the leaky pipe, instead of serving as a mechanism for funneling oil for subsequent piping to the surface?"
I now see that NOAA, in its latest update on the response operation, claim that the gas hydrates threatened to lift the dome off of the sea floor. This must be why BP moved the dome off the leak. But, it still begs the question as to why they can't place something heavier over the leaks, to stop them from flowing. Why couldn't they lower a tank barge, for instance, or even a rail car or locomotive? Presumably objects such as these would be large enough to withstand the pressure from the rising, leaking oil, and not get blown off the site.
"I understand that the dome is not working, because of hydrate formation. I don't understand why you have to pipe the leaking oil to the surface in the first place. Why couldn't you just place a heavy object over the leaky pipe? And since you have the dome down there already, and your plan is not working, why don't you just leave the dome there, on top of the leaky pipe, and shut off the valve at the top of the dome where the oil would normally flow through a pipe to the surface? In other words, couldn't the dome just play the role of placing a cap on the leaky pipe, instead of serving as a mechanism for funneling oil for subsequent piping to the surface?"
I now see that NOAA, in its latest update on the response operation, claim that the gas hydrates threatened to lift the dome off of the sea floor. This must be why BP moved the dome off the leak. But, it still begs the question as to why they can't place something heavier over the leaks, to stop them from flowing. Why couldn't they lower a tank barge, for instance, or even a rail car or locomotive? Presumably objects such as these would be large enough to withstand the pressure from the rising, leaking oil, and not get blown off the site.
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
Worldocean Consulting's Media Presence re Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Dr. Gerald Graham, President of Worldocean Consulting Ltd and marine oil spill response expert, has responded to dozens of media requests in the course of the past two months in connection with the ongoing Deepwater Horizon oil spill incident in the Gulf of Mexico. Here is a partial list of those interviews, with direct links to many of them for download.
1) Daily Planet TV Show Appearance With Paul Workman, Discovery Channel, April 29, 2010
2) KMOX, St. Louis, Missouri Podcast of Radio Interview with John Carney, Monday, May 4, 2010; Interviewed again May 18, 2010- click here for podcast of that interview; Also interviewed on June 2, 2010- click here for that podcast
3) WBT, Charlotte, NC Podcast of Radio Interview with Al Gardner and Stacey Sims, Monday, May 17, 2010; Also Tuesday, May 4, 2010
4) BC Almanac Podcast With Mark Forsythe, CBC, Monday, May 3, 2010
5) WOC, Davenport, Iowa Podcast With Dan Kennedy, Monday, May 3, 2010
6) WIOD, Miami, Florida Podcast With Jimmy Cefalo, Monday, May 3, 2010
7) CKNW Vancouver, British Columbia Podcast with Phillip Till, Monday, May 3, 2010
8) Quoted in Tech News Daily Article: "Gulf Oil Spill Is Testing Ground for Future Cleanup Tech", by Adam Hadhazy, April 30, 2010
9) Quoted in Live Science Article "Experts: Most of the Gulf Oil Spill Won't Be Cleaned Up", by Jeanna Bryner, 29 April, 2010
10) Quoted in Popular Mechanics Article "The State of Oil Spill Cleanup Technology", By Joe Hasler, Monday, May 3, 2010
11) Quoted in Brazilian Newspaper Article, in Portuguese "Robôs tapam um vazamento, mas petróleo ainda escapa", Porto Alegre, Brazil, by Laura Schenkel, May 6, 2010
12) Quoted in St. Petersburg Times Newspaper Article "Stopping the Gulf oil spill: The slowest method is the surest", by Curtis Krueger, May 13, 2010
13) WJBO, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Radio Interview with Kevin Meeks and Matt Kennedy, Tuesday, May 4, 2010
14) KMOX, St. Louis, MI Podcast of Radio Interview on Jon Grayson's Overnight America, Tuesday, May 18, 2010
15) Profiled in Market Watch article entitled "BP ignored siphon-pipe suggestion, oil-spill expert says",by Steve Gelsi, May 18, 2010
16 ) Interviewed for and quoted in AP Article by Michael Kunzelman and Mike Baker, "Inventors say BP ignoring their oil spill ideas", Wednesday, May 19, 2010
17) Interviewed by Kristen Chick for an article to appear in the next Christian Science Monitor Weekend Edition, entitled "How Bad is Gulf Oil Spill? A Global Q&A on Offshore Oil Spills"
18) Reviewed suggestions from Slate readers for stemming BP Deepwater Horizon Leak, in article entitlded " "Freeze It, Crimp It, Plug It, Nuke It", by Josh Levin, Wednesday, May 26, 2010
19) Interviewed June 3, 2010 by Mike Lloyd, News 1130 in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Click here for the first installment of the interview, and here for the second. One of these interviews has been supplemented by a companion piece article, also by Mike Lloyd, entitled "Expert: Dispersants part of ecological oil spill damage; More tar balls being found along the shoreline", June 4, 2010.
20) Interview with Susan McGinnis on Clean Skies TV, Tuesday, June 15, 2010
21) Interviewed by Phuong Le of the Associated Press for article she co-authored with John Flesher entitled "Little Spent on oil spill cleanup technology" , 26 June, 2010
1) Daily Planet TV Show Appearance With Paul Workman, Discovery Channel, April 29, 2010
2) KMOX, St. Louis, Missouri Podcast of Radio Interview with John Carney, Monday, May 4, 2010; Interviewed again May 18, 2010- click here for podcast of that interview; Also interviewed on June 2, 2010- click here for that podcast
3) WBT, Charlotte, NC Podcast of Radio Interview with Al Gardner and Stacey Sims, Monday, May 17, 2010; Also Tuesday, May 4, 2010
4) BC Almanac Podcast With Mark Forsythe, CBC, Monday, May 3, 2010
5) WOC, Davenport, Iowa Podcast With Dan Kennedy, Monday, May 3, 2010
6) WIOD, Miami, Florida Podcast With Jimmy Cefalo, Monday, May 3, 2010
7) CKNW Vancouver, British Columbia Podcast with Phillip Till, Monday, May 3, 2010
8) Quoted in Tech News Daily Article: "Gulf Oil Spill Is Testing Ground for Future Cleanup Tech", by Adam Hadhazy, April 30, 2010
9) Quoted in Live Science Article "Experts: Most of the Gulf Oil Spill Won't Be Cleaned Up", by Jeanna Bryner, 29 April, 2010
10) Quoted in Popular Mechanics Article "The State of Oil Spill Cleanup Technology", By Joe Hasler, Monday, May 3, 2010
11) Quoted in Brazilian Newspaper Article, in Portuguese "Robôs tapam um vazamento, mas petróleo ainda escapa", Porto Alegre, Brazil, by Laura Schenkel, May 6, 2010
12) Quoted in St. Petersburg Times Newspaper Article "Stopping the Gulf oil spill: The slowest method is the surest", by Curtis Krueger, May 13, 2010
13) WJBO, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Radio Interview with Kevin Meeks and Matt Kennedy, Tuesday, May 4, 2010
14) KMOX, St. Louis, MI Podcast of Radio Interview on Jon Grayson's Overnight America, Tuesday, May 18, 2010
15) Profiled in Market Watch article entitled "BP ignored siphon-pipe suggestion, oil-spill expert says",by Steve Gelsi, May 18, 2010
16 ) Interviewed for and quoted in AP Article by Michael Kunzelman and Mike Baker, "Inventors say BP ignoring their oil spill ideas", Wednesday, May 19, 2010
17) Interviewed by Kristen Chick for an article to appear in the next Christian Science Monitor Weekend Edition, entitled "How Bad is Gulf Oil Spill? A Global Q&A on Offshore Oil Spills"
18) Reviewed suggestions from Slate readers for stemming BP Deepwater Horizon Leak, in article entitlded " "Freeze It, Crimp It, Plug It, Nuke It", by Josh Levin, Wednesday, May 26, 2010
19) Interviewed June 3, 2010 by Mike Lloyd, News 1130 in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Click here for the first installment of the interview, and here for the second. One of these interviews has been supplemented by a companion piece article, also by Mike Lloyd, entitled "Expert: Dispersants part of ecological oil spill damage; More tar balls being found along the shoreline", June 4, 2010.
20) Interview with Susan McGinnis on Clean Skies TV, Tuesday, June 15, 2010
21) Interviewed by Phuong Le of the Associated Press for article she co-authored with John Flesher entitled "Little Spent on oil spill cleanup technology" , 26 June, 2010
BC Almanac Interview Podcast
Click here for a podcast of an interview I did Monday, May 3, 2010 on CBC Radio's BC Almanac program, with Mark Forsythe. The subject is the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, from a British Columbia, Canada perspective.
BP Succeeds in Implementing One of My Ideas for Capping Leaky Riser
BP reports that it has succeeded in capping one of the three leaks from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. I suggested this idea to Unified Command on April 28, 2010. It is gratifying to see that at least one of my suggestions was taken seriously, and acted upon, with some success. Hats off to BP for this one at least!
Deepwater Horizon Radio Interview Taped
Here's a link to a radio interview I did two days ago with WBT Charlotte about the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Monday, May 3, 2010
Daily Planet Gulf Oil Spill TV Interview
Click here for a link to a TV interview I did April 30, 2010 on the Discovery Channel's Daily Planet program. It's all about the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Is BP Taking My Advice to Cap Leaky Pipe?
On Sunday, April 25, 2010, just before midnight PDT, I emailed the Deepwater Horizon Unified Command. My email included the following suggestion:
"I keep seeing that picture of the oil seeping from the drill pipe, and wonder whether it would be possible just to cap that pipe somehow, using a ROV with robotic arms, for instance."
When I heard nothing back from them, I emailed them again on May 1. This particular email included several suggestions, including the following:
"1) Use the robotic arm of a ROV to place a cap on the open end of that riser that we keep seeing images of
2) Try to cap the other leaks in the pipe as well, using a similar technique"
Well, eight days after my original suggestion was forwarded, there seems to be movement. Here's a clip from an article that appears on the MSNBC web site this morning:
"BP was trying to cap the smallest of three leaks with underwater robotic vehicles in the hope it will make it easier to place a single oil-siphoning container over the wreck. One of the robots cut the damaged end off a pipe at the smallest leak Sunday and officials were hoping to cap it with a sleeve and valve, Coast Guard spokesman Brandon Blackwell said Monday. He did not know how much oil was coming from that leak. We see this as an opportunity to simplify the seafloor mission a little bit, so we're working this aggressively, BP spokesman Steve Rinehart said."
You be the judge. Can I claim credit for this new attempt to at least partially plug the leak, even if the operation is, as they say, being done in preparation for placing the dome over the leaky pipe in about a week's time? Maybe yes, maybe no. Should BP acknowledge my contribution, perhaps, when the dust settles and this disaster is behind us? Even if my emails had nothing to do with the current effort, or if others advanced the same idea, why would such a seemingly simple, obvious and cheap procedure take them so long to implement?
Now, let's see if it can be done, and what, if any impact it has on the leakage.
"I keep seeing that picture of the oil seeping from the drill pipe, and wonder whether it would be possible just to cap that pipe somehow, using a ROV with robotic arms, for instance."
When I heard nothing back from them, I emailed them again on May 1. This particular email included several suggestions, including the following:
"1) Use the robotic arm of a ROV to place a cap on the open end of that riser that we keep seeing images of
2) Try to cap the other leaks in the pipe as well, using a similar technique"
Well, eight days after my original suggestion was forwarded, there seems to be movement. Here's a clip from an article that appears on the MSNBC web site this morning:
"BP was trying to cap the smallest of three leaks with underwater robotic vehicles in the hope it will make it easier to place a single oil-siphoning container over the wreck. One of the robots cut the damaged end off a pipe at the smallest leak Sunday and officials were hoping to cap it with a sleeve and valve, Coast Guard spokesman Brandon Blackwell said Monday. He did not know how much oil was coming from that leak. We see this as an opportunity to simplify the seafloor mission a little bit, so we're working this aggressively, BP spokesman Steve Rinehart said."
You be the judge. Can I claim credit for this new attempt to at least partially plug the leak, even if the operation is, as they say, being done in preparation for placing the dome over the leaky pipe in about a week's time? Maybe yes, maybe no. Should BP acknowledge my contribution, perhaps, when the dust settles and this disaster is behind us? Even if my emails had nothing to do with the current effort, or if others advanced the same idea, why would such a seemingly simple, obvious and cheap procedure take them so long to implement?
Now, let's see if it can be done, and what, if any impact it has on the leakage.
Sunday, May 2, 2010
Frequently Unanswered Questions; Observations of an On Scene Commander Monitoring the Deepwater Horizon Spill
These are my personal observations after a full week spent constantly tracking, from afar, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response operation in the Gulf of Mexico. My basic point is that in spite of massive coverage of this incident, there are enormous uncertainties about it all, and a lot of conflicting information floating around. Some of these issues and problems have been reported on here and there on TV and the web, but they really are quite fundamental, in my opinion.
For instance, BP claims the oil on the surface is just a fraction of a millimeter thick. But Ed Overton, who, like me, was on Daily Planet the other night talking about the spill, showed us an oil sample that he says is like roofing tar. If they're both right, what could be happening is that Ed's sample is oil that has weathered for a week, when all the lighter, volatile ends have evaporated, etc. But Ed isn't even sure his sample came from the Deepwater Horizon site, or at least he wasn't sure as of two days ago. Then there are the odd reports of tarballs washing ashore; can anyone say for sure that they come from the Deepwater Horizon site? What do the official authorities have to say about all this? They seem to be completely mum on the subject.
Another thing is, they talk about the size of the spill, in terms of area covered, etc. But what really is the thickness of the slick, and how continuous is it? Shots I've seen show windrows of an orangy substance, a type of emulsion, but nothing like the EVOS thick black crude we all remember. NOAA does show maps and graphics with locations of various concentrations of oil on them, plus there are the satellite shots, but it is extremely difficult to get a handle on this spill, from this vantage point at least. People have this image of a huge mass of thick black crude inexorably moving towards shore. Somehow I don't think it's really like that. What you probably have instead are pockets of oil that have weathered at different times and therefore to different extents, but collectively cover a huge area.
Yet another thing is that as I said in my Daily Planet interview on Friday evening, the model I ran predicts that 95% of the leaked oil should either disperse or evaporate naturally within five days. Well, if that's the case, how come the spill can be said to have possibly tripled in size in one day, as at least one scientist believes? Is more leaking out, or is it getting spread around more because of the high winds, and is emulsification adding to it? Or maybe the model is wrong. Who knows? If the authorities know, they should share their information with us.
Then there's the matter of recovery of the oil at sea. How much of what they have cleaned up to date is water and how much oil? I suspect it's mainly water. And what's their recovery rate?; I suspect it's in the single digits, percentage-wise, maybe even as low as 1 percent ( or lower, but let's be generous! ). And speaking of one percent, that's the figure that appeared in the confidential document released the other day with respect to the percentage of the spill area over which dispersants had been applied. ONE PERCENT! That's incredible. Now the authorities are considering using dispersants at the wellhead; how effective is that going to be, given the volumes of oil involved and the 24 hour nature of the flow? And as for the test burn conducted mid-week, somewhere between 75 and 100 barrels of oil were burned in one hour. Fat lot of good that response operation is going to do, in other words.
Personally, I think at this stage consideration should be given to winding down the offshore recovery effort; let's face it, it's just not working. Resources could be better spent trying to stem the flow of oil from the seabed, protecting the shoreline, and cleaning up oil that does hit the beaches. But those protective booms that we see along the shoreline are worse than useless in bad weather; they shouldn't even be out there in the conditions they're now experiencing. And if they are out there, they should be taken ASAP in instead of getting ripped to shreds.
Also, while this spill has the potential to be the worst ever, so far it is not. It looks like it might cause enormous damage, but anything can happen. Pundits are already predicting massive devastation along the Eastern Seaboard, before the spill has even hit the Gulf Coast! It all depends on the winds and the currents, things over which we have absolutely no control.
Lastly, a big unknown is oil underwater. How much is there floating around below the surface, I wonder? Where is it, where is it headed, and what is its fate? Somehow, I shudder to think. Out of sight, out of mind, I guess.
For instance, BP claims the oil on the surface is just a fraction of a millimeter thick. But Ed Overton, who, like me, was on Daily Planet the other night talking about the spill, showed us an oil sample that he says is like roofing tar. If they're both right, what could be happening is that Ed's sample is oil that has weathered for a week, when all the lighter, volatile ends have evaporated, etc. But Ed isn't even sure his sample came from the Deepwater Horizon site, or at least he wasn't sure as of two days ago. Then there are the odd reports of tarballs washing ashore; can anyone say for sure that they come from the Deepwater Horizon site? What do the official authorities have to say about all this? They seem to be completely mum on the subject.
Another thing is, they talk about the size of the spill, in terms of area covered, etc. But what really is the thickness of the slick, and how continuous is it? Shots I've seen show windrows of an orangy substance, a type of emulsion, but nothing like the EVOS thick black crude we all remember. NOAA does show maps and graphics with locations of various concentrations of oil on them, plus there are the satellite shots, but it is extremely difficult to get a handle on this spill, from this vantage point at least. People have this image of a huge mass of thick black crude inexorably moving towards shore. Somehow I don't think it's really like that. What you probably have instead are pockets of oil that have weathered at different times and therefore to different extents, but collectively cover a huge area.
Yet another thing is that as I said in my Daily Planet interview on Friday evening, the model I ran predicts that 95% of the leaked oil should either disperse or evaporate naturally within five days. Well, if that's the case, how come the spill can be said to have possibly tripled in size in one day, as at least one scientist believes? Is more leaking out, or is it getting spread around more because of the high winds, and is emulsification adding to it? Or maybe the model is wrong. Who knows? If the authorities know, they should share their information with us.
Then there's the matter of recovery of the oil at sea. How much of what they have cleaned up to date is water and how much oil? I suspect it's mainly water. And what's their recovery rate?; I suspect it's in the single digits, percentage-wise, maybe even as low as 1 percent ( or lower, but let's be generous! ). And speaking of one percent, that's the figure that appeared in the confidential document released the other day with respect to the percentage of the spill area over which dispersants had been applied. ONE PERCENT! That's incredible. Now the authorities are considering using dispersants at the wellhead; how effective is that going to be, given the volumes of oil involved and the 24 hour nature of the flow? And as for the test burn conducted mid-week, somewhere between 75 and 100 barrels of oil were burned in one hour. Fat lot of good that response operation is going to do, in other words.
Personally, I think at this stage consideration should be given to winding down the offshore recovery effort; let's face it, it's just not working. Resources could be better spent trying to stem the flow of oil from the seabed, protecting the shoreline, and cleaning up oil that does hit the beaches. But those protective booms that we see along the shoreline are worse than useless in bad weather; they shouldn't even be out there in the conditions they're now experiencing. And if they are out there, they should be taken ASAP in instead of getting ripped to shreds.
Also, while this spill has the potential to be the worst ever, so far it is not. It looks like it might cause enormous damage, but anything can happen. Pundits are already predicting massive devastation along the Eastern Seaboard, before the spill has even hit the Gulf Coast! It all depends on the winds and the currents, things over which we have absolutely no control.
Lastly, a big unknown is oil underwater. How much is there floating around below the surface, I wonder? Where is it, where is it headed, and what is its fate? Somehow, I shudder to think. Out of sight, out of mind, I guess.
Saturday, May 1, 2010
Deepwater Horizon Radio Interviews Scheduled for Monday Morning, May 3, 2010
I'm scheduled to do a series of radio interviews early Monday morning, May 3, 2010 on a total of four different US stations. The topic is the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Here's the schedule, including hyperlinks to the programs in question, where you can click to listen live online:
1) KFTK FM, St. Louis, Missouri, 5:10 AM PDT: Allman in the Morning, with Host Jamie Allman
2) WOC, Davenport, Iowa, 5:20 AM PDT: The Morning Report, with Host Dan Kennedy
3) WIOD, Miami, Florida, 5:40 AM, The Jimmy Cefalo Show
4) WBT, Charlotte, North Carolina, 6:15 AM PDT: Charlotte's Morning News, with Al Gardner and Stacey Simms
1) KFTK FM, St. Louis, Missouri, 5:10 AM PDT: Allman in the Morning, with Host Jamie Allman
2) WOC, Davenport, Iowa, 5:20 AM PDT: The Morning Report, with Host Dan Kennedy
3) WIOD, Miami, Florida, 5:40 AM, The Jimmy Cefalo Show
4) WBT, Charlotte, North Carolina, 6:15 AM PDT: Charlotte's Morning News, with Al Gardner and Stacey Simms
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